FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW v. STATE
SOVEREIGNTY: CAN CONGRESS WIN?
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INTRODUCTION

You have finally done it! After years of research, modification and perfection,
you have created the Widget. This Widget is what everyone wants. To protect your
creation you have filed a patent application and you will register your Widget
trademark. Two years later, you have accumulated all of the investments you need.
Your patented Widget TM just hit the market and it is tremendously successful. Your
hard work paid off- you have achieved the American Dream. As you're ready to go
home for the day, the phone rings. It's your sales manager telling you that there is
an identical product hitting the market called "The Widget, Too." After doing a bit of
checking, you find that the imitation is made by State Consolidated Universal
Manufacturing Industries (S.C.U.M.I.), which is an arm of the State. After your
attempts to resolve this issue fail, you file a suit in federal court claiming
infringement of your federal patent and trademark rights.
S.C.U.M.I. contests
jurisdiction and claims sovereign immunity. Since federal patent claims are the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you feel you have nothing to worry about.
To your surprise, the suit is dismissed.
This may sound like a far-fetched scenario, but it is all too real in the wake of
recent decisions handed down by the Supreme Court. To understand the significance
of these recent decisions and congressional attempts to overcome the Court's
objections, we must examine how the Court has arrived at its present understanding
of intellectual property rights.
In this comment, I will examine the historical integration of intellectual
property rights into our culture and jurisprudence. I will then examine the recent
line of cases that have limited federal intellectual property rights as they relate to
state sovereign immunity.
I will also discuss past congressional efforts to remedy
this situation and analyze the provisions and the flaws in the strategy being
considered by Congress. I will propose that the only way Congress can achieve its
objectives in a manner that will withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court is to
enact a constitutional amendment.

I. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The need for laws protecting intellectual property rights has been the subject
of some debate, but is an entrenched part of our legislative heritage. 2 Over 2,500
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years ago, the Sybarites granted proprietary rights for culinary creations. 3 In the
16th century, the Doge of Venice granted Galileo Galelei's petition for exclusive rights
to his new invention. 4 The concept of exclusive proprietary rights in one's creation
slowly spread across Western Europe. Although subject to a great deal of abuse over

IFRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doe. No. 15-85, at 21, 44-45,
50-54, 79-80 (1958). Fritz Machlup, in a report to Congress, discusses the four best known theories
that advocate the creation and continued existence of the patent system along with their basic
premises and assumptions. The theories include the natural law theory (an inventor's property
right in her own ideas is a natural right and society is morally obligated to recognize and protect
this right), the reward by monopoly theory (justice requires that society should intervene and secure
for an inventor a reward for services proportionate to the invention's usefulness; a temporary
monopoly is a simple and effective method for society to secure such an award), the monopoly as
profit incentive theory (assuming industrial progress is desirable and inventions are necessary for
such progress, a capitalist society must provide adequate economic incentive to make it worth while
for inventors to invest money and time into their efforts), and the exchange for secrets theory
(progress can not be obtained if inventors keep their inventors secret therefore there is a bargain
between society and inventors whereby inventors surrender their secrets in exchange for temporary
protection of the use of those secrets). Machlup further discusses the arguments for and against
each of these theories specifically pointing to times and cultures throughout history that did not
have such a system in place but did not suffer any lack of progress or inventive activity. See also
MACAULAY, PROSE & POETRY, 731 (G. Young ed. 1967) (delivering a speech in the House of
Commons in 1841 arguing the begrudging need for the continuing existence of copyrights; discussing
the historical import of copyright and the need to reward authors for their creations so as to promote

their efforts; and arguing that copyright, being a monopoly, is a necessary evil but should only
extend as long as is needed to secure the public good).
2 MACHLUP, supra note 1, at 79-80. Machlup concludes that whatever the justification for the
existence of the patent system and despite the counter arguments available for many of the
justifications, the system of intellectual property rights and protections has become an important
part of our cultural and legal history which justifies its continued existence. Id.
3 GILES S. RICH, THE "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT' SINCE ARISTOTLE, Address At The Foundation For A
Creative America Bicentennial Celebration - United States Patent and Copyright Laws (May 9,
1990) (on file with author). Judge Rich quotes an ancient writer named Athenaeus who in turn
quotes an earlier historian named Phylarcus. Phylarcus is said to have stated,
[t]he Sybarites, having given loose to their luxury, made a law that... if any
confectioner or cook invented any peculiar and excellent dish, no other artist was
allowed to make this for a year; but he alone who invented it was entitled to all
the profits to be derived from the manufacture of it for that time; in order that
others might be induced to labour at excelling in such pursuits...
Id. While the authority and accuracy of this quote is not verifiable, it is intriguing to note that this
early form of patent was attributed to the Sybarites. This also marks one of the earliest known
sovereign systems for the granting patent rights to private individuals. Id.
Id. Galileo's invention was a "machine for raising water and irrigating land with small
expense and great convenience." Judge Rich goes on to note that one of the conditions of the grant
was that the machine had never before been made or thought of by others, which presents a
startling parallel to our current laws. Venice went on to enact the first general patent law, the
preamble of which said
[w]e have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenuous
devices; and in the view of the grandeur and virtue of our City, more such men
come to us every day from divers part. Now, if provision were made for the words
and devices discovered by such persons, so that others, who may see them, could
not build them and take the inventors' honor away, more men would then apply
their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great utility and benefit
to our commonwealth.
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the years, 5 it was a familiar concept to the American colonists.

6

The Massachusetts

Bay Colony enacted a law in 1641 permitting short-term exclusive grants for new
inventions.7 Many of the other colonies enacted similar laws shortly thereafter.
It is, therefore, no surprise that our founding fathers deemed intellectual
property rights of vital interest to our country. The need for such rights was
important enough that it was addressed in the Constitution. The Framers of the
Constitution gave Congress the Power "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their Writings and Discoveries."8 The very first Congress enacted "An Act to
promote the progress of useful Arts."9 This Act was this country's very first federal
patent law. 10

A. A Closer Look at The Standards
Until 1985, it was generally presumed that the intellectual property laws
enacted by Congress provided adequate protection from infringement by states. In
1985, the Supreme Court gave its opinion in Ataseadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.11
In Atascadero, the Court held that Congress must make its intention to abrogate a

5 Id.
English monarchs granted limited monopolies to reward faithful servants and courtiers.
These monopolies removed items from the public domain and gave individuals exclusive rights to
trade in those items. Such patents included salt, iron and playing cards. This practice was
eventually abolished by Parliament with the passage of the Statute if Monopolies in 1624. The
Statute of Monopolies contained an exclusion stating,
patents and Graunts of Priviledge for the tearme of one and twentie yeares or
under, heretofore made of the sole workings or makings of any manner of newe
Manufacture within this Realme, to the first and true Inventor or Inventors of
such Manufactures, which others att the time of making of such Letters Patents
and Graunts did not use, soe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor mischievous to
the State, by raising the proves of Commodoties at home, or hurt of Trade, or
generallie inconvenient, but that the same shalbe of such force as they were or
should be if this Acte had not been made, and of none other.
Id.
6 Id. The colonists were not only exposed to patents on inventions, but also were aware of the
burden of the abusive monopolies granted by English Monarchs on commodities such as salt, iron
and plating cards before this practice was abolished. Id.
7 The specific provision read "No Monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but such
new Inventions that are profitable to the Country, and that for a short time." RICH, supra note 3.
Although this provision is intended to prohibit monopolies, it does grant an exclusion for what we
commonly know as patents. Id.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §2, note 2 (citing 1 Stat. 109).
10 Unlike previous patents in this country, which were granted by ad hoe legislation in
response to specific petitions, this Act authorized civil servants to review applications and grant
patents for a fourteen-year term. Id. The burden of reviewing the application proved too much and
the process was amended to a simple registration process. Id.
11 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). This suit was brought against
Atascadero State Hospital, a state hospital. It alleged that the hospital denied Douglass James
Scanlon employment because of his physical handicap in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. The suit was filed in Federal District Court and sought compensatory, injunctive and
declaratory relief.
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state's sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 12 The
language of the federal intellectual property laws in effect at that time did not
include the requisite express language and could no longer provide a remedy against
infringements by states. 13 The Ataseadero decision sparked congressional debate,
but it was not until 1992 that Congress secured the breaches in the intellectual
property legislation. 14 These pieces of legislation were specifically designed to meet
the standards set forth by the Court in Ataseadero.15 Each of these acts included
language expressly providing for suits against states for infringements of intellectual
16
property rights.

B. A New Look at an O1dAmendment
In 1795, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution was
ratified in response to the Court's 1793 decision in Chisoim v. Georgia.17 Although
the language of the Eleventh Amendment only excludes diversity suits brought by a
citizen of one state against another state from federal jurisdiction, the Court has
expanded its application.1 8
The judicially created doctrine of state sovereign
immunity was originally an offshoot of the Eleventh Amendment but was not truly
part of the amendment itself.19 The relationship between the Eleventh Amendment
12

Jd. at 243.

1' Id.

The acts then in effect did not specifically include states in the definition of terms. Nor
did Congress express intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity within the body of the legislation.
14 After a great deal of debate, Congress succeeded in passing three acts to specifically address
the Atascadero decision. Id. In 1990 Congress enacted the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749. This was eventually followed by the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230, and the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567, which were enacted in 1992.
15 Congress expressly included states in the definition of a person subject to each of the
respective Acts and included language indicating that the purpose of these acts was to include states
within the scope of each act. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat.
at 2749; Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230; Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567.
16 See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749; Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230; Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567.
17Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). This case was brought in federal court against the
State of Georgia by a citizen of another state. The Supreme Court held that the State of Georgia
was subject to suit in federal court filed by the citizen of another state. Id. This decision was so
controversial that it resulted in the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment which specifically
removes suits by a citizen of one state against another state from federal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
ISIn Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), the Court admits that the "text of
the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only Article III diversity jurisdiction," however,
the Court has consistently explained the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment as standing for the
fundamental concept of state sovereign immunity from private suits. See also Alden v. Maine 119 S.
Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999) (describing state sovereign immunity as a fundamental attribute existing
at the time of the framing of the Constitution and extending its application to suits brought in state
court); U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
1) Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. See also James E. Pfander, An "Explanatory"
Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1269-70 (2000) (explaining that the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity was seen as being reinforced by the Eleventh Amendment and was not a
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and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity has undergone radical change 20 as
demonstrated in the Court's decision in Alden v. Maine.21 The decision in Alden was
an extension of the Court's decision three years earlier in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v.
Florida.22 In Seminole Tribe, the Court inexorably entwined the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.2 3 The Court explained that the
two are not separate, related ideas and instead decided that the Eleventh
Amendment equals the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 24 The Court went on to
expose the logical result of the constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity - a
dramatic shift in the Federal-State balance of power. 25 The Court did note, however,
that the Fourteenth Amendment grants a specific extension of federal powers 26 and
legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment can validly abrogate
27
states' sovereign immunity.
The Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe created a stricter standard than the one
it espoused in Ataseadero.28 It is no longer sufficient for Congress to unequivocally
express its intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity. 29 Congress is additionally

constitutional mandate because the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment explicitly limited the
circumstances under which states would be excluded from federal jurisdiction).
20 See generallyPfander, supra note 19, at 1269 (examining the gradual expansion of the role
of state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment and the profound difference between its
original interpretation and its current interpretation).
21119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
22 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. This suit was filed in Federal District Court alleging violation
by the State of Florida of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d). The suit sought
to compel the negotiations by the State of Florida as required under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act.
23 "Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Court states that one of
the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to "avoid the indignity" of a court coercing a state at the
behest of private parties. Id. at 59.
24 See id. at 54 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment is not understood by what the text
says but rather by the proposition that each State is a sovereign entity and it is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty to require consent before being subject to suits by private individuals). The
Court goes so far as to declare that "suits against unconsenting states '[were] not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States."' Id. (quoting Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)). This proposition is highly suspect since the Chisolm Court was
more intimately aware of what was or was not contemplated in the framing of the Constitution and
determined that the judicial power of the United States did extend to private suits against
unconsenting States. Chisolm, 2 U.S. 419.
25 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (affirming that the Eleventh Amendment significantly
restricts federal judicial power).
26 See id.at 59 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment expands federal power and
restricts state autonomy).
27 See id.(stating that the specific powers granted to Congress by the Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate the sovereign immunity granted by the Eleventh
Amendment).
28 Id.

29 Id.
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required to trace its authority to enact such legislation to an amendment after the
30
Eleventh Amendment.
In 1997, the Court issued its opinion in City of Boerne v. Fores,3 1 which had
a tremendous effect upon the reality of state sovereign immunity. At issue in this
case was the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 3 2 (RFRA).
Congress passed the RFRA in response to the Court's earlier decision in Employment
Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith [hereinafter Oregon v.
Smith].33 In Oregon v. Smith, the Court upheld a law criminalizing the use of peyote
against a 'free exercise of religion' challenge.3 4 The Court relied upon the general
applicability of the statute in arriving at its decision upholding the law. 35 Congress
36
responded by passage of the RFRA.
Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity under the RFRA and enacted it pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power. 37
City of Boerne called upon the Court to determine the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the RFRA.38 The Court found the RFRA
unconstitutional and, in doing so, further fed the specter of state sovereign
immunity. 39
The Court's decision drastically restricted congressional ability to
circumvent the sovereign immunity doctrine by subjecting legislation to strict yet ill4
defined standards in order to validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity. 0

30 See Seminole Thibu, 517 U.S. at 56-60 (stating that Congress cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause but can abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
31 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). This suit was brought by the Archbishop of
San Antonio, Texas, against the City of Boerne. Local zoning authorities denied the Catholic
Archbishop a building permit to enlarge an existing Church under an ordinance governing the
preservation of historic buildings. This suit alleged violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993.
32 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
3 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This
suit was brought by two members of the Native American Church who used peyote as part of their
religious rituals. Under an Oregon law criminalizing the use of peyote, the Native Americans lost
their jobs and were denied unemployment benefits because of such use.
M Id.
35 "The

only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass
constitutional muster ... were cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake." Id. at
881-82.
36 The "RFRA prohibits 'government from 'substantially burdening' a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can
demonstrate the burden '() is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest."' City ofBoerne, 521 U.S.
at 515-516, (quoting the RFRA of 1993 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1 (1994)).
'37See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-17 (acknowledging Congress' stated intention of enacting
the RFRA pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
38 "The parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' § 5 power 'to
enforce' by 'appropriate legislation' the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any
person of 'life, liberty, or property without due process of law' nor deny any person 'equal protection
of the laws."' Id. at 517.
39 The Court's decision in City of Boerne did not directly address the issue of sovereign
immunity or the Eleventh Amendment, however, it restricted the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. at 519-20.
40Id. at 520.
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C. The Valid Exercise of CongressionalAuthority
The City of Boerne Court reiterated its earlier position that the enforcement
power of the Fourteenth Amendment does allow Congress to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity. 41 The Court, however, went on to examine whether that
congressional power was validly exercised in the RFRA. 42 While there is certainly
nothing unusual about the U.S. Supreme Court reviewing legislation to determine
whether it was a valid exercise of power, 43 the City of Boerne Court severely
constricted the scope of power granted to the federal government by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 44 In its ruling, the Court added an additional consideration in
45
determining whether Congress has validly abrogated a state's sovereign immunity.
First, the Court determined that Congress did make its intention to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 46 Second, the
Court admitted that Congress enacted the RFRA pursuant to the powers granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 When the Court turned its attention to whether the
RFRA was a valid exercise of congressional power, it identified two critical
restrictions to enacting legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) The
Fourteenth amendment does not give Congress the power to change the meaning of a
right to be protected; 48 and (2) The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is remedial in nature and does not grant Congress the power to enact

41 See id. at 518 (upholding congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
42 Id. This additional analysis is not truly an extra step, but the Court's exploration and
resolution of whether the RFRA was a valid use of congressional authority is so distinct from any
analysis suggested in Seminole Tribe, that it takes on the stature of a wholly new test.
43 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (stating that federal legislative power is
limited and defined by the Constitution and upholding the process of judicial review).
44 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518-28 (citing prior cases that have examined the validity of
legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
4
See id. at 529-32 (emphasizing that legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment must be remedial in nature).
46 Id. This determination is implicit in the Court's decision since it moves on to the questions
of the professed source of congressional power and its validity.
47 Id. The Court recounts the congressional findings in the RFRA, which recite the basis of
congressional authority as,
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution;
(2) laws 'neutral' towards religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in [Oregon v. Smith], the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirements that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.
City ofBoorno, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting the RFRA of 1993 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994)).
48 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (defining the restrictions upon the scope of legislation
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).
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new substantive protections. 49 The Court found that the RFRA failed in both
respects and was not a valid exercise of Congressional authority and held that the
RFRA was unconstitutional. 50 The impact of City of Boerne upon federal protection
of intellectual property was not fully realized until almost two years later.
In two decisions issued on the same day in 1999, College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board [hereinafter College
Savings], 51 and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank [hereinafter FloridaPrepaic,52the Court extended the analysis it used
in City of Boerne to the validity of federal intellectual property legislation. 53 Both of
these decisions invalidated congressional attempts to subject the states to liability for
violation of intellectual property rights. 54 The Court did acknowledge that Congress
55
had unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate state's sovereign immunity
and that Congress traced its authority to enact the legislation in question to the
Fourteenth Amendment. 56 The Court focused its analysis, as it did in City of Boerne,
on whether the federal intellectual property protection scheme was a valid exercise of
57
the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
The Court determined that Congress did not validly abrogate states'
sovereign immunity in its intellectual property protection legislation. 58 This decision
has received much criticism and Congress has been considering legislation to

49Id. at 520.

50 The Court generally treats these two issues concurrently, however, the conclusion of the
Court shows that it was actually considering two separate grounds for rejection of the
constitutionality of the RFRA: (1) the doctrine of separation of powers; and (2) maintaining the
federal-state balance. Id. at 536. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is the judiciary's
province to interpret the meaning of the constitution and Congress cannot legislate a new meaning.
Id. Pursuant to the doctrine of federal-state balance, the court looked to the history of the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to support its position that the grant of power is limited to
remedial legislation. Id. at 520-23.
51 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
College Savings Bank, seller of deposit contracts for funding college tuition, brought this action in
federal court against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board for violation of the
Lanham Act. College Savings alleged that Florida Prepaid used false advertising and engaged in
unfair competitive practices. The suit was dismissed by the District Court and the decision was
affirmed by the appellate court.
52 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
This suit decided the same day as College Sa., 527 U.S. 666, was brought in federal court by
College Savings Bank against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board. College
Savings Bank alleged violation of its patent rights. The district court denied Florida Prepaid's
motion for dismissal and the appellate court affirmed.
53

See generally Coll.Sav., 527 U.S. 666; Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627.

5 See Coll.Say., 527 U.S. 666; Fla.Prepaid,527 U.S. 627.
55 ".
Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to 'clarify that States, instrumentalities of
States, and officers and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are subject to suit in
Federal court by any person for infringement of patents and plant variety protections."' Fla.
Prepaid,527 U.S. at 632.
56 Id. at 633.
507Id.
58 "[T]he provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventative object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior." Id. at 638.
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overcome the Court's objections. 59 In its current form, the legislation will not be able
to overcome the Court's concerns. 60 Furthermore, it is doubtful that any legislation
proposed by Congress could validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity in the eyes
of the Court and at the same time, achieve Congress' intent to provide uniform
intellectual property protection. 61 The specific concerns of the Court cannot be
addressed by ordinary legislation at this time; therefore, Congress should pursue a
constitutional amendment that would overcome the restrictions of the Eleventh
Amendment with respect to intellectual property rights.

ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 1835, hereinafter S. 1835, entitled the Intellectual Property
Protection Act of 1999,62 was drafted in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in
College Savings and Florida Prepaid6 3 The bill is representative of Congress'
strategy and clearly expresses Congress' intent to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity and subject states to actions in federal court for infringements of
intellectual property rights. 64 This is sufficient to address the Supreme Court's
concerns as stated in Atascadero.65 The bill also clearly draws upon the Fourteenth
59 See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 105th Cong. (1999)
(referring expressly to the Court's decision in College Savings and FloridaPrepaid.
60 See generally Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. 666; Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627; City of Boerne, 521 U.S.

507.
61 See generally Coll. Say., 527 U.S. 666; Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627; City ofBoerne, 521 U.S.
507.
62 S. 1835, supra note 59.
63 The findings include the following:
(8) In 1999, the Supreme Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) . . . that
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act could not be
sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
(9) As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Prepaid a
patent owner's only remedy under Federal patent laws against a State infringer of
a patent is prospective relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
(10) On the same day it decided Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court in
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) . . . extended State sovereign immunity to purely
commercial activities of certain State entities.
S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a)8-10.
64 The purpose of the legislation is to "provide other Federal remedies to owners of Federal
intellectual property rights as against the States," S. 1835, 105th Cong. §2(b)(3), and to:
abrogate State sovereign immunity in suits alleging violations of Federal
intellectual property laws or challenging assertions of Federal intellectual
property rights by States to the maximum extent permitted by the United States
Constitution, pursuant to Congress's powers under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution and any other applicable
provisions.
S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(b)(4).
65 See generalyAtaseadero,473 U.S. 234 (requiring clear expression of congressional intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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Amendment for its authority, thereby meeting the Court's criteria as expressed in
Seminole Tribe.66 In order to validate its authority to enact this legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 67 Congress emphasizes that intellectual property rights are
true property rights and indicates that the violation of those rights may be
68
equivalent to the seizure of property.

II. LEAPING THE HURDLES TOWARDS A VALID USE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
S. 1835 was designed to address the Court's concerns as expressed in College
Savings and Florida Prepaid.69 In crafting S. 1835, Congress does not appear to
70
appreciate the application of City of Boerne to federal intellectual property rights.
It may be that Congress is under the mistaken impression that its findings will sway
the Court; 71 however, a careful reading of the Court's decisions make it clear that this
72
legislation will not hold up to future scrutiny by the Court.

A. Interestin a Uniform System
Congress identifies the need for a uniform system for the protection of
intellectual property rights.7 3 Congress also determines that the lack of a uniform

66 See generally Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (requiring an abrogation of state sovereign
immunity to trace its authority to an amendment after the Eleventh Amendment). See also S. 1835,
supra note 59, at § 2(b)(4) (attributing congressional authority to abrogate state sovereignty to the
Fourteenth Amendment).
67 The entire section of findings is presented to bolster the need for Congressional intervention
in the eyes of the Supreme Court. S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a).
68 "A violation of the Federal intellectual property laws by a State may also constitute an
unconstitutional deprivation of property under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution." S.1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a)(24). Soo also, S. 1835, supra
note 59, at § 2(a)(23) C. . . a claim for the taking of property in violation of the public use
requirement is ripe at the time of the taking").
6 The findings contain numerous express and implied references to Florida Prepaid and

College Savings. S. 1835, supra note 59.
70 Although City of Boerne involves the RFRA, the Court's analysis will be similar in any case
involving a law purporting to be appropriate legislation under the 14th Amendment. The City of
Boerne analysis has become a significant consideration in interpreting the constitutionality of
legislation. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy,
109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1945 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of the Court's analysis in City of
Boerne as it applies to sovereign immunity); Ann Woolhander, Old Property,New Property, and
Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 919, 929 (March, 2000) (pointing out that the
standards used by the Court in FloridaPrepaidoriginated in the Court's analysis of City of Boerne).
71 The Court in Florida Prepaidrefused to take the findings of Congress at face value and
instead examined the support in the record to conclude that the findings were not substantiated.
Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 648-49.
72 See id. at 645-49 (expressing skepticism and requiring factual evidence beyond a conclusory
recitation of findings).
73 "There is a strong Federal interest in the development of uniform and consistent law
regarding Federal intellectual property rights." S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (1999).
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system of protection may compromise our obligations under various treaties.7 4 The
75
first part of this argument was already addressed by the Court in FloridaPrepaid.
The desire for a uniform system of protection is not sufficient justification for the
Court to alter the constitutionally established balance of power between the federal
government and the states.7 6 In light of the constitutionalization of sovereign
immunity, 77 congressional argument about treaty obligations will also fail to sway
78
the Court.

B. A Deprivation ofProperty
The more persuasive argument made by Congress concerns the deprivation of
property. 79 Congress characterizes intellectual property infringement as seizure of
property,8 0 thereby bringing such infringement into the scope of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.8 1
The result is that unless a state provides just
compensation for the deprivation of intellectual property, it should be subject to suit
in federal court.8 2 The reasoning is straight forward and logical but hardly qualifies
84
as novel.8 3 In fact, the Court already addressed this issue in Florida Prepaid.
71 "The Seminole Tribe, Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions have the potential

to . . . compromise the ability of the United States to fulfill its obligations under a variety of
international treaties." S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a)(11)(b). Congress does not, however, discuss
how these decisions will lead to a compromise of U.S. obligations, nor does it provide any
justification as to why such concerns should expand federal legislative power. Id.
75 In Florida Prepaid,the Court conducted a detailed analysis into the need for a federal
system of protection. This included an examination of the House and Senate Reports. See Fla.
Prepaid,52 U.S. at 647 (reviewing testimony given at congressional hearings).
76 The Court in FloridaPrepaiddetermined that the interest in a uniform system of protection
for intellectual property "is a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather that
to any determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property
without due process of law." Id.
77 See generally James E. Pfander, Once More Unto the Breach. Eleventh Amendment
Scholarship & the Court 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (2000) (discussing the evolution of sovereign
immunity and the Eleventh Amendmen). Se also Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in
ConstitutionalAdjudication.*the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 953, 954-56 (2000) (examining the changes in the sovereign immunity doctrine).
78 See generallyFla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627 (reinforcing limitations on federal power).
79 S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1999). See also Woolhander, supranote 70, at 956-63 (criticizing
the Court's interpretation of property as defined under the Constitution for purposes of the Due
Process Clause versus the common understanding of intellectual property rights as property).
80 Congress determined that "it is necessary and appropriate for Congress to exercise its power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to protect the
constitutional rights of owners of Federal intellectual property rights, which are property interests
protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution." S. 1835,
supra note 59, at § 2(a)(19).
81 The Fourteenth Amendment is generally interpreted to extend the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to apply to state activity. Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645.
82 See Woolhander, supra note 70, at 956-63 (emphasizing that if intellectual property rights
are true property rights then the taking of such property without compensation would be considered
a deprivation of property without due process).
83 See Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645 (agreeing that patents are property but arguing that
infringement is not automatically a Fourteenth Amendment violation).
84 Id.
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Congress attempts to add new credibility to this argument by emphasizing the
proprietary nature of intellectual property rights through various findings.S5 These
findings indicate that intellectual property rights fall within Congress' definition of
property, but the meaning of the word "property" as it appears in the Constitution is
for the Court to interpret.8 6 An earlier attempt by Congress to tailor constitutional
definitions was soundly rejected by the Court in City of Boerne8 7 and will likely fail
in future confrontations. The Court has already recognized the proprietary nature of
intellectual property rights,88 but it has also indicated that intellectual property is
not within the scope of constitutionally protected property rights.8 9 Even if the Court
were to alter its position and decide that intellectual property infringements were
deprivations of constitutionally protected property, Congress has not established that
such depravations have occurred without due process.
In FloridaPrepaid,the Court emphasized that its analysis centered on whether
property was taken without due process. 90 The Court went on to conclude that there
were sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the due process requirement. 91 In
particular, the Court emphasized the availability of other actions. 92 In addition to
prospective relief through an action against a state official, an injured party could

85 Several of the congressional findings stress the proprietary aspect of intellectual property
rights. S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(20)-(21) (1999).
According to the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank, "the hallmark of a
protected property interest is the right to exclude others." Patents, copyrights,
and trademarks are constitutionally cognizable species of property because they
secure for their owners rights of exclusion against others. A State may not
exercise any of the rights conferred by a Federal intellectual property law without
the authorization of the right holder, except in the manner and to the extent
authorized by such law.
S. 1835, supra note 59.

86 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 176). But see
Woolhander, supra note 70, at 956-63 (criticizing the Court's enforcement of a limited definition of
property despite historical and legal evidence clearly supporting the congressional view).
87 City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 528-29.
88 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647 ("Patents, however, have long been considered a species of
property..."). The Court even admits that patents "are surely included within the 'property' of
which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law," but declines to consider
intellectual property rights as constitutionally protected property rights. Id.
89 The Court entirely excludes consideration of intellectual property infringement on
substantive due process grounds. Id.
This is consistent with the Court's treatment of other
statutorily created property such as welfare benefits. See Woolhander, supranote 70, at 935-936.
90 "The Court has accordingly held that [i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by
the state of a constitutionally protected interest . . . is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law."' Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 648 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
91"Here the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that the States were
depriving patent owners of property without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in
federal-court patent actions." Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646.
92 The Court is particularly concerned with the absence of congressional references to the
availability (or lack thereof) of alternative remedies. Id. at 649. The Court also notes that Florida
provides "a legislative remedy through a claims bill for payment in full, Fla. Stat. § 11.065 (1997), or
a judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim." Id. at 649 n. 9 (citation omitted). The
Court declined to determine whether such remedies would provide sufficient protection of Due
Process rights. Id. at 649
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pursue damages against state officials in their individual capacity. 93 The Court also
noted that many states had actions available in their courts. This argument sufficed
94
for the majority in Florida Prepaid,
but such a patchwork remedy is of small
96
95
and contains holes large enough to swallow injured parties.
comfort to Congress
Nevertheless, since the Court has so recently examined this issue, it is unlikely to
reach a different conclusion absent new circumstances.

C. Express Waiver

In College Savings, the Court rejected the idea that the state's actions
amounted to a waiver of its claim to sovereign immunity. 9 7 In S. 1835, Congress lays
out express provisions for states to opt into the federal intellectual property program
thereby waiving sovereign immunity claims. 98 It is common practice with spending
bills and other legislation to tie the federal support to specific state action 99 and the
Court has indicated that a voluntary waiver would overcome the sovereign immunity
defense. 100 The fatal premise of this scheme, however, is that, under S. 1835, states
are not eligible for federal intellectual property rights unless they voluntarily waive
their claim to sovereign immunity.101
Even the use of Congress' spending power to induce 'voluntary' state action is
not valid when the gift being withheld is highly significant. 10 2 In this respect,
9:3The viability of injunctive suits and suits against officers in their individual capacity has
become suspect under the Court's shift in interpretation of the sovereign immunity doctrine. See
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Sehizophlreia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 874-88
(2000) (calling into question the viability of private suits against state officers after considering the
impact of the Court's recent decisions).
Such suits were certainly adequate when sovereign
immunity was an historical and cultural doctrine supported by the Eleventh Amendment. However,
by reading sovereign immunity as an integral part of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has
weakened the reasoning it used in such cases as ExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Id.at 644.
94 See generally Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627 (concluding that the availability of alternative
actions itself resolves the due process concerns).
95 The findings and purpose of the proposed legislation clearly show the emphasis Congress
places upon providing a uniform system of protection for intellectual property infringement. S.
1835, 105th Cong. § 2 (1999).
96 An aggrieved party may not actually be able to bring a suit for the infringement of the
intellectual property and may be forced to rely upon a tort action. Even this option would be limited
to injunctive relief and would not compensate the party for past damages. See generally Vazquez,
supra note 93; Jackson, supra note 77 (discussing limitations of alternative remedies).
97 Coll. Say., 527 U.S. at 679-81.
98 Congress expressly disqualifies states from the federal intellectual property protection
scheme but allows states to opt into the program if they agree to waive claims of sovereign
immunity. S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 111.
99 The Court finds Congress' use of the spending power to encourage state compliance
acceptable because such spending is gratuitous. Coi. Say., 527 U.S. at 686-87.
100 The Court contrasts the situation where a State "express[es] unequivocally that it waives its
immunity" as "fundamental[ly] differen[t]" from "Congress' expressing unequivocally its intent that
if a State take a certain action it shall be deemed to have waived that immunity." Id. at 680-81.
The latter does not meet Constitutional requirements while the former may. Id.
101 See S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 111-112 (depriving states of federal intellectual property
protection unless a waiver of sovereign immunity is obtained).
102 The Court hypothesizes that "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Coil. Say., 527 U.S. at 687
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Congress' own findings emphasizing the importance of intellectual property rights
undermine its ability to withhold those same rights from the states. 0 3 Although the
findings are insufficient to place intellectual property within the constitutional
definition of property, they serve to establish the role intellectual property plays in
our society,10 4 and, therefore, the magnitude of the right Congress would be
withholding from the states.1 0 5 The Court has acknowledged the significance of
intellectual property rights10 6 and would likely find that withholding the entire
bundle of intellectual property rights from the states to procure a waiver is far too
coercive to qualify as voluntary.107

D. Remedial Nature
In City of Boerne, College Savings, and Florida Prepaid, the Court
emphasized that legislation enacted pursuant to the enforcement clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be remedial in nature to be a valid exercise of
congressional authority.10 8 For legislation to qualify as remedial in nature, there
must be a showing of a pervasive problem that Congress is trying to resolve and the
remedy must be narrowly tailored to address the problem.10 9 Although Congress
does attempt to show the existence of a pervasive problem, there is no attempt to
narrowly tailor the legislation.110

(quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Such compulsions would destroy
the voluntary aspect required for the waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. See also William A.
Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Un-fnished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 853-54
(2000) (discussing the difference between voluntary waiver on the part of the state and abrogation
by Congress).
103 See S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a) (emphasizing the importance of intellectual property
rights).
104 See id. (emphasizing the proprietary nature of intellectual property rights and their
economic significance).
105Id.
1o6
Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 642.
107 "In any event, we think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States'
sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed -- and the
voluntariness of waiver destroyed -- when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of
the State from otherwise lawful activity. Coil. Say., 527 U.S. at 687. But see Woolhander, supra
note 70, 937-39 (questioning the distinction between certain property which receives due process
protection and other property that does not receive such protection under the Court's reasoning).
108 While Congress does not expressly reference City ofBoerne in the proposed legislation, the
findings do make an attempt to portray the legislation as a remedial measure and an appropriate
response to the problem of States' infringements of intellectual property rights. S. 1835, 105th
Cong. § 2(a)2729 (1999).
109 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (... there must be a congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved."); Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 638 (requiring that the remedial
measures be appropriate for the nature of the specific harm).
110See S. 1835, supra note 59, at § 2(a)27 (asserting that "[s]ome States have violated Federal
intellectual property rights . . . and have refused to waive their constitutional immunities"). See
also id. § 2(a)28 (concluding that "[a]s a result, violations of Federal intellectual property rights by
states have become increasingly more widespread").
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1. Showing of a PervasiveProblem
Congress lists a number of items to show that state infringement of
intellectual property rights is a pervasive problem.111 Most of the points made by
11 2
Congress have already been addressed by the Court in FloridaPrepaid.
In fact, in
Florida Prepaid,the Court looked at records of congressional hearings, which were
held to support the contention that a Fourteenth Amendment remedy was needed;
the Court concluded that the hearings suggested the opposite.11 3 Of key concern to
the Court was whether states were using sovereign immunity to secure unfair
advantage without due process. 114 The Court decided that the problem was not so
pervasive as to require a federal remedy.1 1 5 Congressional attempts to sway the
Court must, at the very least, show that claims of sovereign immunity by states are
increasing in intellectual property cases.11 6 Additionally, Congress needs to show
that other remedies, which may be available in those situations would not afford
117
adequate relief.
Congress could overcome this particular problem by including findings of the
specific number of intellectual property cases where states claimed sovereign
immunity for each of the past several years in the bill itself. Congress could also
demonstrate the magnitude of the unfair advantage gained by the states in those
cases.

2. A Narrowly TailoredRemedy
The second part of the analysis the Court uses to confirm the remedial nature
of Fourteenth Amendment legislation is whether the legislation is narrowly tailored
to the protected interest. 118 Senate Bill S. 1835 is completely devoid of any attempt
to narrowly focus on the interest involved; 119 primarily as a result of congressional
intent to develop a uniform system of protection.1 20 By its very nature, congressional
desire for a uniform system of protection is antithetical to the Court's mandate for a
narrowly tailored remedy. 121 The Court has indicated that evidence that a remedy is
narrowly tailored includes limitation in time or place or some showing that lesser

111

Id. § 2(a)28

112Fla. Prepaid,527

U.S. at 63948.
Id. at 64044.
114 The Court acknowledges that sovereign immunity gives states an advantage over other
potential defendants but emphasizes that such advantage is conferred by the Constitution. Coil.
Say., 527 U.S. at 685-86. The focus for the Court is therefore whether the measures adopted are
targeted to remedy any procedural due process concerns. Fla.Prepaid,527 U.S. at 642-43.
15See generallyFla.Prepaid,527 U.S. 627; Coll.Say., 527 U.S. 666.
116See Fla.Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645-46.
117 Id. at 643-45.
1IS See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (emphasizing the need for proportionality between the
injury and the remedy).
119 See generallyS. 1835, 105th Cong. (1999).
120 "There is a strong Federal interest in the development of uniform and consistent law
regarding Federal intellectual property rights." S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a)2 (1999).
121 Congress desires sweeping legislation, which would be uniformly applied, but this is exactly
what the Court is prohibiting. Fla.Prepaid,527 U.S. at 644-45,647-48.
113
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measures would not provide an adequate remedy. 122 A narrowly tailored remedy
would need to be restricted to those states that do not provide adequate alternative
remedies or to those states that engage in these specific unfair practices. 123 Such
limitations would defeat Congress' professed interest in providing a uniform system
of intellectual property protection. 124 Congressional interest, however, must take
second place to constitutional limitations as interpreted by the Court. 125 As long as
the Court imposes the remedial nature requirement, Congress will be forced to limit
its legislation unless it can show that no lesser remedy would provide adequate
protection. 126 The currently proposed legislation clearly will not survive review by
the U.S. Supreme Court.

PROPOSAL
The situation is not hopeless for Congress. The Court in its opinions offer
several tactics Congress could implement to provide remedies for states' infringement
127
of intellectual property rights.

III. AN OLD MEANS TO AN OLD END
Congress could limit the applicability of this legislation to those states that do
not offer adequate alternative remedies. 128 It could limit the applicability to those
states that have used the sovereign immunity defense in the past. 129 It could even

withhold certain funds from states that do not voluntarily participate in an
administrative remedial system. 130 None of these possibilities, however, would be
able to provide the uniform remedy that Congress is attempting to put in place.

122 See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-46 (suggesting that limiting the applicability of legislation
or providing facts to show that other available remedies are inadequate would lend weight to
Congress' arguments); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-34 (giving of examples of narrowly tailored
remedial measures).
123 Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646-47. Soo also Vazquez, supra note 70, at 1955 (suggesting a
limited application scheme).
124 S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a)2 (1999).
125 This is repeatedly emphasized in the Court's opinions in FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. 627, and
Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. 666.
126 Fla. Prepaid 527 U.S. at 64348.
127 See id. at 646-47 (suggesting that the remedy could be limited to instances where there is
no state remedy available or to intentional infringement); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (using
regional limitation as an indication of appropriately narrow remedy).
128 Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 646-47.
129 This option is suggested by the general discussion in the Court's opinion. Id.
130 Soo Coil. Say., 527 U.S. at 68687 (affirming the practice of securing state waivers in
exchange for grants under the spending power as long as the gift withheld is not overly coercive).
This is actually a reasonable compromise, but still does not guarantee uniformity.
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A. Start From the Very Beginning
The best way Congress can validly achieve its goal of implementing a uniform
system is through an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A new
constitutional amendment would be able to overcome the limitations of the Eleventh
Amendment1 31 and would revitalize congressional authority to enact federal
legislation protecting intellectual property rights. 132 Congress would be able to enact
uniform remedies under such an amendment and would be able to subject states to
133
suit by individuals if they violated an individual's intellectual property rights.

B. A Nightmare Alternative
A constitutional amendment is the best way for Congress to achieve its objective,
but there are alternatives.1 3 4 The alternatives would require a major shift in the
135
fundamental understanding and structure of intellectual property rights.
Intellectual property does not have to be private property. It could in fact be public
property held by the federal government and licensed to private individuals. It does
not even have to be property at all - thereby allowing Congress to withhold it from
states that do not voluntarily waive claim to sovereign immunity. 136 These
nightmarish alternatives could achieve congressional ends, but would destroy the
137
historical and cultural role of intellectual property rights in the process.

CONCLUSION

Intellectual property is an important part of this country's cultural and legal
heritage.1 38 Whether it is attributed to a desire to protect the rights of individuals to
the fruits of their labor, to the need to provide an incentive for creativity, or as a

131 Soo Sminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (reaffirming the ability of Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to amendments enacted after the Eleventh Amendment).
132 An amendment would also keep Congress from encountering additional judicial hurdles

which may arise in the future.
1:3:3This, of course, assumes that such an Amendment was appropriately constructed.
The
Amendment should specifically empower Congress to enact appropriate legislation to remedy
violations of intellectual property rights by the states.
131 See generally MACHLUP, supra note I (discussing various arguments against our current
system of intellectual property rights).
135 Although the Court has determined that Congress cannot alter the constitutional definition
of property, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528-29, federal intellectual property rights are legislatively
created and could be legislatively limited. The scope and nature of intellectual property rights can
be changed by Congress.
1:36 By decreasing the inherent value of intellectual property, Congress could effectively
withhold it from states that do not voluntarily abrogate their sovereign immunity claim. See
gone-rally Coil. Sav., 527 U.S. at 691.
137 Such traumatic shifts in ideology would undermine the very purpose and findings that led
Congress to pursue such legislation. It would also undermine the value that Congress attaches to
intellectual property rights. S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2 (1999).
138 See generayVMACHLUP, supra note 1; Woolhander, supra note 70.
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reward, or an exchange, 139 the founding fathers deemed these rights important
enough to expressly empower Congress to protect them. 40 In the series of decisions
beginning with Ataseadero and culminating in College Savings and FloridaPrepaid,
the Court has consistently refuted congressional attempts to create a uniform federal
system of protection for intellectual property rights from infringement by the
States.141 Congress has made repeated attempts to subject states to suit in federal
court for infringement of intellectual property rights; 142 however, the Court has
consistently upheld states' sovereign immunity claims in such actions. 143 In the
course of those decisions, the Court has transformed the meaning and importance of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our jurisprudence.1 44 What started out as a
historical ghost, judicially resurrected and bound to the Eleventh Amendment, went
1 45
through a gradual metamorphosis until it was cloaked in constitutional armor.
Once the doctrine of sovereign immunity was given the supremacy of constitutional
authority it blocked many attempts by Congress to allow individuals to subject states
to suit in federal court.
Congress next turned to the Fourteenth Amendment in order to achieve its
legislative objectives. The Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment trumps
the Eleventh Amendment, 146 but has worked to judicially limit this route to a narrow
trail with numerous obstacles. 147 Congressional attempts to navigate this trail and
overcome the obstacles have so far resulted in failure.1 48 The last obstacle appears to
be David's sling-stone, capable of defeating the congressional Goliath. Congress has
proposed legislation in the form of S. 1835 which was intended to provide a uniform
system of protection for intellectual property rights.1 49 This proposed legislation,
however, could not succeed.
13) What is actually the justification for the recognition of intellectual property rights is the
subject of much debate. MACHLUP, supra note 1. The several competing theories have all existed
for some time and all offer plausible reasons, but there has not been any consensus as to why we
currently observe intellectual property rights. Id. Each of the theories also have plausible counterarguments that suggest we should not have intellectual property rights at all, but Machlup contends
that the arguments for and against the existence of intellectual property rights are relatively
balanced. In light of this balance, Machlup concludes that the present system should stay in place.
[.
M U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

141 See generallyAtaseadero, 473 U.S. 234; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44; City of Boerne, 521
U.S. 507; Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627; Coll.Say., 527 U.S. 666.
14H2
S. 1835, 105th Cong. (1999), is the latest proposed revision in a series of revisions to the

federal intellectual property protection system.
143 See, e.g., Atascadero,473 U.S. at 243 (identifying concrete requirements).
M See Vazquez, supra note 70, at 1934-37 (describing the transformation of the sovereign
immunity doctrine); Woolhander, supra note 70, at 932 (examining how the change in the sovereign
immunity doctrine has affected the Court's definition of property).
115
Vazquez, supranote 70, at 1934-37; Woolhander, supra note 70, at 932.
146 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (Recognizing the validity of abrogating states sovereign
immunity via the Fourteenth Amendment).
147Through City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, Florida.Prepaid,527 U.S. 627, and College Savings,
527 U.S. 666, the Court has narrowly defined "appropriate legislation" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and has further interpreted the Amendment to restrict Congress to remedial action of
limited scope.
148 See generallyFla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627; Coil. Sav., 527 U.S. 666.
149 See S. 1835, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1999) (emphasizing Congress' desire to provide a uniform
system of protection for intellectual property).
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Even if Congress is able to convince the Court of the significance of the
problem, it will not be able to tailor a remedy that is acceptable to the Court without
compromising its own goals. The congressional goal of providing a uniform system of
intellectual property is in direct conflict with the Court's requirement that the
remedy be narrowly tailored to address the specific problem. In light of the Court's
strict insistence that the remedy be limited in scope, the only way Congress could
enact a uniform remedy would be to show that states were uniformly depriving
individuals of intellectual property without due process. Since some states may offer
alternative remedies, Congress would not be able to demonstrate such uniform
abuse.
The only way Congress can enact a uniform federal remedy for violations of
intellectual property rights and successfully abrogate a state's sovereign immunity is
through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The amendment should specifically
allow Congress to enact legislation to provide relief for violations of intellectual
property rights by all parties including states, state officials, and state entities.
Without such an amendment, nothing short of redefining our entire intellectual
property system will uniformly subject states to suit in federal court for
infringements.

